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"Ifyou want peace, work forjustice."
Pope Paul VI
-

The International Criminal Court (ICC) came into existence on July 1,
2002. It is the first permanent court ever established to investigate and try
individuals for the most serious violations of international humanitarian
law, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The
decision to create the ICC remains controversial. The Rome Diplomatic
Conference on the Establishment of an ICC concluded on July 17, 1998,
at which time the ICC Statute was adopted." The Conference lasted 5
weeks with the final vote on the Rome Statute resulting in 120 states in
* Mark Ellis is the Executive Director of the International Bar Association in London,
England. Mr. Ellis would like to express his gratitude to Jennifer Kent and Victoria McColm who
provided invaluable and substantial research for this Article.
1. Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment ofan International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9
(1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute].
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favor, 7 states against, and 21 states abstaining. 2 Support for the ICC was
overwhelming. However, several key states, most notably the United
States, were among those opposing or abstaining. The Statute required
sixty ratifications before the ICC would come into existence. On April 11,
2002, ten states deposited their ratifications simultaneously in a ceremony
at the Nineth Preparatory Commission meeting, bringing the total number
of ratifications to sixty-six.' The fact that the ICC gained the support it
needed so quickly, and so soon after the Rome Conference in 1998, was
unexpected and surpassed nearly everyone's hopes, especially since

treaties dealing with issues that affect the sovereignty of states usually take
decades to ratify.4 The establishment of the ICC represents a remarkable
and rapid development in international law.
Now that the ICC is officially in existence, states who ratified the
Statute must begin thinking pragmatically about how the establishment of
the ICC will affect their domestic laws and about what they must do to
ensure compliance. This Article explores the concept of complementarity
as it is embodied by the Rome Statute, focusing on how it will affect
domestic law and whether it will promote or hinder national capacity
building. It .also suggests a new mechanism that would involve the
international community in determining whether a state has the capacity
to undertake national prosecutions.
I. INTRODUCTION

The concept of creating a court that would have the power to try
individuals, especially leaders and high ranking officials, on international
humanitarian crimes has been discussed for some time. The international
community has long sought the establishment of a permanent ICC. Dating

2. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, The Rome Treaty for an International Criminal
Court: A BriefSummary of the Main Issues, Vol. 2, No. I (Aug. 1998), availableat http://www.

lchr.org.icc/papv2nl.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2002).
3. CNN, InternationalWar-Crimes Court Approved (July 18, 1998), available at http://

www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9807/18/crimes.trib/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2002).
4. Vesselin Popovski, The InternationalCriminal Court: A Synthesis of Retributive and
Restorative Justice, 15 INT'L REL. 1, 1 (2000).
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back to the end of World War I(1919), scholars have wrestled with ways
of holding individuals accountable for gross violations of international
humanitarian law.5 However, until now no permanent international
tribunals have come into existence.
In 1947, the U.N. General Assembly requested that the International
Law Commission (ILC), then referred to as the Codification of
International Law, begin to codify the principles of international law that
emerged from the Nuremberg Tribunal. 6 The first draft statute for
establishing an ICC was completed in 1950.7 Finally, in 1994, the ILC
produced a comprehensive draft statute for an international court which
was submitted to the U.N. General Assembly.! Four years later, on July 19,
1998, the Rome ICC Statute was adopted.9
The purpose of the ICC is to investigate and prosecute individuals
accused of committing gross violations of international humanitarian law:
genocide,' ° crimes against humanity," war crimes 2 and the crime of
5. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 3 (1998).
6. G.A. Res. 174, U.N. GAOR, 2nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947).
7. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on Questions ofInternationalCriminal
Jurisdiction,U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., U.N Doc. A/CN4/5 (1950) [hereinafter Report ofILC - 5th
Sess.].
8. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission. U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10,

U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994).
9. See ICC Statute, supra note 1.

10.

"[G]enocide" means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, such as: (a)
Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d)Imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring
children of the group to another group.

See id. art. 6.

11. For the purpose of the ICC Statute,
"crime against humanity" means any of the following acts when committed as part
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d)
Deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e) Imprisonment or other severe
deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international
law; (f)Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial,
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other
grounds that are universally recognized as permissible under international law, in
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aggression. 3 Recognizing that millions of people had been victims

of

"unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock[ed] the conscience of

humanity," the parties to the Statute felt that these acts threatened "the

peace, security and well-being of the world."' 4 It is hoped that by putting

an end to impunity for these types of crimes, the international community

can contribute to preventing such crimes. 5 Thejurisdiction of the ICC will
not be limited to a geographical area or chronological period. 6 The ICC
will apply to both international armed conflicts and internal conflicts. An
independent prosecution, State Parties, and the Security Council will be
able to refer cases to the ICC.
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the ICC; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime of
apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing
great suffering, or serious injury to body, or to mental, or physical health.
Id. art. 7.
12. For the purpose of the ICC Statute,
"war crimes" means: (a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949, namely, any of the following acts against persons or property protected
under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention: (i) Wilful killing; (ii)
Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; (iii) Wilfully
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health; (iv) Extensive
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and
carried out unlawfully and wantonly; (v) Compelling a prisoner of war or other
protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power; (vi) Wilfully depriving
a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial;
(vii) Unlawful deportation, or transfer, or unlawful confinement; (viii) Taking of
hostages.
Id. art. 8.
13. For the time being, the ICC cannot exercise jurisdiction over crimes of aggression until
defined by the ICC. Id.art. 5(2). There has never been a generic definition of terrorism. The failure
to obtain a recognized definition of international terrorism is because of the diverse nature of
terrorism and the political nature of trying to define its characteristics. In 1996, the United Nations
created an ad hoc committee to conclude a comprehensive terrorism convention. See Draft
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 55th Sess.,
Agenda Item 166, at I, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/55/l (2000) (putting into effect an international counterterrorism convention). The most comprehensive terrorism convention is the European Convention
on the Suppression of Terrorism. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, signed
Jan. 27, 1977, entered into force Aug. 4, 1978 (CMD. 703 1), Europ. T.S. No. 90, 15 I.L.M. 1272
(1976). Although there is no attempt to define terrorism, the Convention does stipulate acts that are
prohibited. See generally id.
14. See ICC Statute, supra note I, pmbl., paras. 2, 3.
15. Id. para. 5.
16. Id.
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II. COMPLEMENTARITY
The concept of complementarity can be viewed as a procedural and
substantive safeguard against a supranational institution curtailing the
sovereign rights of nations. It ensures that the judgments of a domestic
court are not replaced by the judgments of an international court. There

has long been a debate among international legal scholars concerning the
role of domestic courts in handling international crimes. The debate
centers on whether gross violations of international humanitarian law
should be tried only through international tribunals or whether domestic
state courts might undertake that role. "The history of the second half of
the Twentieth Century" indicates that the obligations of states to prosecute
violations of international humanitarian law were "only minimally
respected."'"

Until recently, domestic courts rarely prosecuted people accused of
committing international crimes. In fact, other than the Nuremberg and
Tokyo war crimes trials, 8 the prosecutions for such crimes were viewed
as a "historical anomaly."' 19 For instance, "[a]ll First World War
criminals.., received fewer years in prison than a single armed burglar
convicted in 1920. '2o By providing amnesty, the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne

ended any attempts to hold Turkish officials responsible for the 1915
massacre of Armenians."' There were some exceptions. For instance,
during the administration of U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, U.S.
troops were accused of committing atrocities against guerillas in the war
in the Philippines.22 Rather than whitewash the affair, Roosevelt acted

17. INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR CRIMINAL LAW REFORM AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: MANUAL FOR THE RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
ROME STATUTE 84 (2000), available at http://www.ichrdd.ca/frame.iphtml?langue=0 (last visited

Dec. 6, 2002) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL].
18. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 7, 59 Stat. 1544, 8

U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter IMT Charter]; Charter for the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East, Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S No. 1589.
19. Jonathan I. Charney, Editorial Comments: International Criminal Law and the Role of
Domestic Courts, 95 AM. J.INT'L L. 120, 120 (2001).

20. See Popovski, supra note 4, at 2.
21. Id. at 1.
22. See generally EDMUND MORRIS, THEODORE REX (2001).
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decisively. He court-martialled the general responsible for committing the
atrocities and wrote a strongly worded cable denouncing such acts.23
Slowly, there has been a shifting trend towards greater state participation in war crime prosecutions. Since the late 1940s, crimes of gross
violations of international humanitarian law, as contained in the ICC
Statute, have been binding customary international law and are not new to
the international community. Genocide is based on the 1948 Genocide
Convention 4 and customary international law. War crimes embody the
four Geneva Conventions of 19495 and their two Additional Protocols,26
to which all states are a party, and are customary international law. Crimes
against humanity also embody existing customary international law. In
short, these crimes are part of international law, binding on all states and
incorporate at least, in part, the concept of universal jurisdiction. They are
also crimes that have similar criminality under the domestic laws of most
states.
With the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR),27 the international community witnessed an increased
number of domestic courts undertaking trials involving international
crimes. These two tribunals have provided states with the legal foundation

23. The cable read, in part, that the President
intends to see that the most vigorous care is exercised to detect and prevent any
cruelty or brutality, and that men who are guilty thereof are punished... [n]othing
can justify or will be held to justify the use of torture or inhumane conduct of any
kind on the part of the American Army.
See id. at 101.
24. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Prevention Convention].
25. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S 31; Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T 3316, 75 U.S.T.S 135; Geneva Convention
Relative to the protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S 287.
26. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, openedfor signature
Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144; Protocol IIAdditional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12,
1949, openedfor signature Dec. 12, 197-7, U.N. Doc. A/32/144.
27. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR,
48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 art. 1 (1993) [hereinafter ICTYStatute]. Statute
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. SCOR., 44th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 15,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 & Annex art. 1 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
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and encouragement to undertake domestic war crime trials. The European
Court of Human Rights28 has also developed into an effective regional
judicial arbitrator, creating a common European law of human rights.29
However, this court, as well as the ICTY and the ICTR, were never
intended to replace domestic courts and neither is the ICC. 30 The ICC is
intended only to complement national jurisdiction.3 1 Therefore, the
creation of the ICC will only accelerate the current trend to domestic
jurisdiction because of the priority of the ICC towards domestic courts
through the introduction of the concept of complementarity.32 This concept
clearly establishes the reach of the ICC, and sets out the boundaries
between the ICC and the domestic courts. However, at the heart of this
principle is the understanding that the most serious crimes of concern to
the international community must be prosecuted at a national level. 3
As such, the Statute creates a complex set ofjurisdictional foundations
that limit the authority of the ICC, and defers to the good faith
34
investigative efforts and prosecutorial discretion of domestic courts.
Complementarity refers to the principle that the ICC can gain jurisdiction
only when domestic legal systems are unwilling or genuinely unable to
carry out an investigation or prosecution of an accused individual. 35 Thus,
unlike the statutes for the ICTY and the ICTR, the ICC gives preference
to domestic courts if they are capable of conducting fair trials.
The ICC cannot hear a case when a state has made a decision to act.36
Thus, under the concept of complementarity, the ICC will only have
jurisdiction if there is a breakdown in the national system of justice or a
state simply fails to act.37 It will not interfere with the judicial matters that
naturally fall within the jurisdiction of states and are handled with

28. The European Court of Human Rights hears cases brought under the European
Convention of Human Rights, signed by all forty-three member states of the Council of Europe.
29. James A. Goldstone, Roma Rights, Roma Wrongs, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 146, 154 (2002).
30. In fact, a claimant before the European Court of Human Rights must first exhaust all

domestic judicial avenues.
31. The U.N. International Law Commission (ILC) had placed the principle of
complementarity in the preamble of its draft statute. Draft Statute for an InternationalCriminal
Court Preparedby the InternationalLaw Commission U.N.GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N.
Doc. A/49/10 (1994).
32. See Chamey, supra note 19, at 120.
33. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, pmbl.
34. ABA Memorandum of House of Delegates Report- International Criminal Court, Dec.
20, 2000 [hereinafter ABA Memo].
35. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 17.
36. See IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL, supra note 17, at 84.
37. Lori Sinanyan, The InternationalCriminalCourt: Why the UnitedStates ShouldSign the
Statute (But Perhaps Wait to Ratify), 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 1171, 1195-96 (2000).
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principles of due process. The ICC is limited in exercising jurisdiction
without the consent of a sovereign government that could otherwise
exercise jurisdiction on its own.38 The ICC does not violate or erode the
principle of state sovereignty. a9
In fact, there is little reason to fear the loss of state sovereignty under
the principle of complementarity of the Statute. The fact is that there is a
very real threat that the ICC will become dormant for the very reason that
complementarity shields states from the jurisdiction of the ICC. Even if
the U.N. Security Council refers a case to the ICC for prosecution,40 the
jurisdiction of the ICC will be excluded if the state with jurisdiction to
investigate is willing and able to initiate the investigation.
There is also another practical reason for the ICC to adopt the concept
of complementarity. The potentially large number of future violations of
crimes under the ICC Statute makes it impossible for the ICC to gain
jurisdiction over more than a small number of cases. Every state will have
to struggle through domestic trials if it has experienced domestic genocide.
The genocide that took place in Rwanda in 1994 is a clear example of the
type of dilemma that the international community might again face. At the
current rate of prosecution, it is estimated that it will take 113 years to try
Rwandan suspects. There are 110,000 genocide suspects that remain in
detention in 19 prisons and 154 lock-up cells in Rwanda.4'
III. IMPACT OF COMPLEMENTARITY ON DOMESTIC LAW AND NATIONAL
CAPACITY BUILDING

A question that is frequently asked is what impact will the concept of
complementarity have on domestic law and national capacity building.
Although there are undoubtedly many seen and unforeseen consequences
of complementarity, there are several issues that are already apparent for
nation-states.
The concept ofcomplementarity will likely push states to retain control
over prosecuting nationals charged with violating international
humanitarian law.42 States will place precedence on domestic jurisdictions

38. See ABA Memo, supra note 34.
39. Government Urged to Ratify InternationalCriminal Court, AUSTRALIAN LAW (Apr.
2001), availableatwww.lawcouncil.asn.au/download.html?table-publications&oid=1959451859
(last visited Sept. Ii, 2002) [hereinafter Government Urged].
40. See ICC Statute, supra note 1,art. 13(6).
41. Leah Werchick, Article: Prospectsfor Justice in Rwanda's Citizen Tribunals,8 HuM.
RTs. BRIEF 15, 15 (2001).
42. See Charney, supra note 19, at 122.
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over international jurisdiction where they have the capacity to undertake
domestic war crime trials. Under the concept of complementarity, states
will stress that primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting
international crimes should remain part of the sovereignty of a nation.43
They will be reluctant to admit to judicial inadequacies that would transfer
a case to the ICC.44
State sovereignty is a powerful concept in international law. Therefore,
states will hold firm to retaining control over domestic prosecutions unless
it is in the self-interest of the state to refer these matters to international
tribunals. It is almost inconceivable that a state, whose legal system is
functioning, would not at least investigate accusations of crimes that fall
under the ICC. The risks for failing to maintain control over the
proceedings are high because once the ICC requests the surrender of a
person, a state cannot refuse to investigate.45 Consequently, states will
likely aggressively and fairly pursue domestic prosecutions of
international crimes so as not to trigger the jurisdiction of the ICC over the
case and invite the glare of the eyes of the international community upon
it.
Additionally, the potential benefits of complementarity to states will
not exist if these same states do not possess domestic legislation that
adequately covers the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the ICC Statute.46
,State Parties are required to "cooperate fully with the ICC in its
investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction" of the
ICC.4" State Parties cannot refuse to comply with a request from the ICC
for assistance or cooperation.48 However, many states do not currently
have sufficient legislation to cover comprehensively the subject matter
jurisdiction of the ICC.49 The Statute specifically requires State Parties to
"ensure that there are procedures available under their national law for all
of the forms of cooperation."5 State Parties will have to review and update
their domestic legislation closely in order to achieve complementarity with
the ICC. However, every State Party to the Rome Statute will be free to

43. See Government Urged,supra note 39, at 3.
44. In fact, a number of states were reluctant to create a court that would impinge on national
sovereignty. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE
IsSuES, NEGOTIATIONS, AND RESULTS 47-51 (Roy S.Lee ed., 1999).
45. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 89(1).
46. Katherine L. Doherty & Timothy L.H. McCormack, "Complementarity" as a Catalyst
for ComprehensiveDomesticPenalLegislation, 5 U.C. DAVIS J.INT'L L. &POL'Y 147, 149(1999).
47. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 86.
48. Id.
49. See Doherty & McCormack, supra note 46, at 150.
50. ICC Statute, supra note 1,art. 88.
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select the way in which it will implement its treaty obligations." States
may create a unified piece of legislation that covers all aspects of
implementation, or amend the existing legislation.
States are still completing the process of implementing the ICC Statute
in their national legal systems.5 2 For a number of countries, the ICC treaty,
as an international treaty, will have to be specifically incorporated into
domestic law. This treaty ratification process exists in common law
countries. For instance, states like Canada, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom have introduced comprehensive implementing legislation that
conforms their domestic legislation to permit them to cooperate fully with
the ICC and to prosecute crimes enumerated in the ICC Statute.53 Other
countries need only to ratify the ICC Statute for it to become law. This is
because in most civil law countries international treaties are binding on the
state and have precedence over domestic law, including the constitution.
Most states, however, are still in the process of reviewing their
domestic legislation for compatibility with the ICC Statute, and
determining what changes are required in national legislation to ensure
maximum cooperation.54 For example, few states have implemented the
Geneva Conventions and the prohibition against humanity into national
law.55 They must also ensure that all ICC crimes are incorporated into

51. See IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL, supra note 17, at 9. A number of states have moved on
a two-track approach: ratification of the ICC Statute by a special legislative act, which is followed
by the adoption of national implementing legislation at a later date. Other states prefer the one-track
approach that combines the ratification and national implementing legislation inone legislative act.
See ProgressReport on the Ratification andNationalImplementing Legislation of the Statutefor
the Establishmentof an InternationalCriminalCourt, International Human Rights Law Institute,

DePaul University, (7th ed. 2001).
52. The Council of the European Union adopted the common position on the ICC which
requires member-states to "share with all interested states their own experiences on the issues
related to the implementation of the Statute." Council of the European Union, COUNCIL
COMMON POSITION of)) June 2001 on the InternationalCriminalCourt,art. 2(3), O.J. (L 164)

5, availableat http://ue.eu.int/pesc/ICC/pdf/eu/ICCOen.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2002).
53. Crimes AgainstHumanityand War Crimes Act 2000, availableathttp://www.parl.gc.ca/

36/2/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/government/C-19/C-19_3/9009/bE.html (last visited Sept. 20,
2002); InternationalCrimes andInternationalCriminalCourtAct 2000, availableat http://rangi.

knowledge-basket.co.nz/gpacts/pubic/text/2000/se/026se3.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2002).
54. ProgressReport on the RatificationandNationalImplementingLegislationofthe Statute
for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, International Human Rights Law

Institute, DePaul University, (9th ed. 2001).
55. Making the InternationalCriminal Court Work - A Handbookfor Implementing the

Rome Statute, HUM. RTs. WATCH, Sept. 2001, Vol. 13, No. 4(G), at 16, available at
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/handbook_e.pdf(last visited Sept. 20,2002) [hereinafter
Making the ICC].
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national legislation. For instance, the crime of murder found in national
law is not the same as a crime against humanity - since it lacks the
requirement of intent - or other acts that constitute a crime against
humanity.
The legislative changes will not only focus on substantive law. Many
states will need to introduce new procedures in areas such as criminal
procedure law, witness and victim protection, and financial assistance to
the ICC.56 For instance, states will have to recognize the privileges and
immunities of judges, the Prosecutor, the Registrar and other ICC staff."'
States will also have to extend their criminal law penalizing a series of
offences set forth in the Statute.5" State Parties will have to criminalize
these offences under their national law. The offences include the
following:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Giving false testimony;
Knowingly presenting false or forged evidence;
Corruptly influencing a witness;
Obstructing or interfering with the attendance or testimony of a

witness;
5. Retaliating against a witness for giving testimony;
6. Destroying, tampering or interfering with the collection of evidence;
7. Intimidating or corruptly influencing an ICC official for the purpose of
forcing or persuading the official not to perform, or to perform
improperly, his or her duties;
8. Retaliating against an ICC official for performance of his or her duties;
and
9. Soliciting or accepting a bribe as an ICC official in connection with
official duties.59

In addition, states will have to adopt administrative procedures to allow
them to respond to requests by the Prosecutor.6'
56. IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL, supra note 17, at 13.
57. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 48(5).
58. Id.arts. 70(I), 70(4)(a).
59. Id. art. 70.
60. Id. art. 18(5). Similarly, the ministers of the Council of Europe "express(ed) its readiness
to provide states which so request, in the framework of existing legal co-operation programs, with
the appropriate assistance with a view to the ratification and implementation of the Rome Statute."
Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Declaration on the International Criminal Court
(adopted by the Committee of Ministers on October 10, 2001, at the 768th meeting of the
Ministers' Deputies), para. 8(V), available at http://cm.coe.int/stat/E/Public/200I/adopted_

texts/declarations/2001dec6.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2002).
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States will also be forced to ensure that their domestic judicial systems
incorporate and adhere to principles of due process recognized by
international law. The ICC Statute requires all criminal proceedings to
meet the highest standards of international law. In essence, state
procedures must protect judicial independence, impartiality, and equality.
Accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC, however, should not require a
wholesale change to the criminal justice system of a state if standards for
due process have already been adopted from international human rights
instruments (i.e., The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).6 However, for states
who become party to the Statute and who have not embraced these
standards, the ICC will require them to ensure basic rights for the accused.
At a minimum, these states will have to respect the basic rights of a person
who is under investigation in accordance with Article 55(2) of the Statute.
That person has the following rights of which he or she shall be informed
prior to being questioned:
(a) To be informed, prior to being questioned, that there are grounds
to believe that he or she has committed a crime within the
jurisdiction of the [ICC];
(b) To remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in
the determination of guilt or innocence;
(c) To have legal assistance of the person's choosing, or, if the
person does not have legal assistance, to have legal assistance
assigned to him or her, in any case where the interests ofjustice
so require, and without payment by the person in any such case
if the person does not have sufficient means to pay for it; and
(d) To be questioned in the presence of counsel unless the person
has voluntarily waived his or her right to counsel.62
State Parties will also likely be forced to enact further rights for the
accused that are set out in Article 55(1) ofthe Statute, which are applicable
to everyone involved with an ICC investigation. Article 55(1) of the
Statute gives the accused the right to not incriminate themselves, to not be
subjected to coersion, the right to a competent interpreter, and the right to
not be deprived of their liberty. Since due process begins when a

61. See IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL, supra note 17, at 13.
62. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 55(2).
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person is arrested, states will have to make certain that the minimum
required standards under international law for a fair trial are in place."3
The ICC also guarantees the highest standards of rights and protection
for the accused at trial. As part of strengthening their domestic legal
systems, State Parties will have to comply with acceptable international
standards for fair trials. Specifically, State Parties will have to provide in
all national trials the following rights for defendants:
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and
content of the charge, in a language which the accused fully
understands and speaks;
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the
defence and to communicate freely with counsel of the
accused's choosing in confidence;
(c) To be tried without undue delay;
(d)... to be present at the trial, to conduct the defence in person or
through legal assistance of the accused's choosing, to be
informed, if the accused does not have legal assistance, of this
right and to have legal assistance assigned by the Court in any
case where the interests of justice so require, and without
payment if the accused lacks sufficient means to pay for it;
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her
and to obtain the attendance and examination ofwitnesses on his
or her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him
or her. The accused shall also be entitled to raise defences and
to present other evidence admissible under this Statute;
(f) To have, free of any cost, the assistance of a competent
interpreter and such translations as are necessary to meet the
requirements of fairness, if any of the proceedings of or
documents presented to the Court are not in a language which
the accused fully understands and speaks;
(g) Not to be compelled to testify or to confess guilt and to remain
silent, without such silence being a consideration in the
determination of guilt or innocence;
(h) To make an unsworn oral or written statement in his or her
defence; and
(i) Not to have imposed on him or her any reversal of the burden of
proof or any onus of rebuttal.'
63. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Feb. 23, 1967, art. 10(1), 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 1.L.M. 368, 371 [hereinafter ICCPR].
64. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 67.
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States will also need to be knowledgable of internationally recognized
human rights standards that relate to the gathering of evidence collected
by the state on behalf of the ICC. For the purposes of determining the
admissibility of evidence, it is likely that the ICC would rely on standards
approved by the U.N. General Assembly and found in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,65 the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights," the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners,67 the U.N. Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons
under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment,"8 the U.N. Basic Principles
on the Independence of the Judiciary,69 the U.N. Guidelines on the Role of
Prosecutors,"° and the U.N. Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers.7" In
addition, the ICC may look to the humanitarian law standards set out in the
four Geneva Conventions and their additional Protocols, since they have
also received widespread support within the international community.72
The ICC will also help to clarify what extrajudicial proceedings are
acceptable to undertake under domestic law by determining what will
constitute unwillingness to prosecute. States will undoubtedly experiment
with various extrajudicial proceedings when trying to determine criminal
liability. Some scenarios are easier to discern than others. For instance,
under the Statute, military courts can be used to prosecute individuals
since there is no statutory distinction between ordinary courts and military
courts.
The establishment of truth commissions is one of the more common
forms of extrajudicial proceedings and will be a focus for states
undertaking domestic war crime proceedings. There has been a steady rise
in the number of truth commissions being constituted. Since 1974, more
65. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (II), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).

66. See generally ICCPR, supra note 63.
67. See generally United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment ofPrisoners,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF/61 1, annex I,E.S.C. Res. 663C, 24 U.N. ESCOR Supp. No. 1,at 11, U.N. Doc.
E/3048 (1957); E/S/C/RES/2076, 62 U.N. ESCOR Supp. No. 1, at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977).
68. See generally United Nations Body of Principlesfor the Protections of all Persons under
Any Form ofDetention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. GAOR, 173d Sess., Supp. No.
21, at 298, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1988).

69. Seegenerally UnitedNations Basic Principles on the Independence oftheJudiciary, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/40/146 (1985) [hereinafter UN. Principles].
70. See generally United Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 144/28/Rev. 1 (1990).
71. See generally United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 144/28/Rev. 1(1990).
72. See supra notes 25, 26.
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than twenty-one truth commissions have been established.73 Truth
commissions are here to stay. However, do truth commissions provide
justice as envisaged by the ICC Statute? Truth commissions tend to be
restorative rather than retributive.74 To the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, restorative justice "encourages victims,
offenders and the community to be directly involved in resolving
conflict[s]." 75
The fact that truth commissions are created as a way to avoid criminal
proceedings, that they do not seek punishment or retribution, and that they
allow for amnesty, could be viewed as incompatible with the duty to
prosecute diligently under the ICC Statute. At the very least, any truth
commission whose purpose is to avoid criminal proceedings would be
viewed as incompatible with the duty to prosecute diligently under the
Statute. It could be argued that truth commissions simply overshadow and
undermine prosecutions, and, in fact, have become a mechanism to avoid
bringing about justice. In addition, truth commissions have not always
been effective in creating respect for human rights.76
Supporters of truth commissions argue that "the ICC and truth
commissions should not be viewed as mutually exclusive [because]
[r]etributive justice [through the ICC,] and restorative justice [through
truth commissions,] ultimately have similar goals and can benefit from
each other."7 7 Although the ICC may be a turning point where prosecution
and accountability are favored over reconciliation and forgiveness, the ICC
might determine that such truth commissions are important in negotiating
a difficult political transition in a post-conflict environment.7"
Another example of potentially problematic extrajudicial responses are
traditional or culturally accepted local customs. For example, an
extrajudicial proceeding that is currently being used in Rwanda is the
gacaca system which is a form of indigenous conflict resolution.79 The
gacaca tribunals are vested with all the powers held by the Rwandan courts
and the office of the prosecutor. Therefore, the tribunals can determine the
73. Jonathan D. Tepperman, Truth and Consequences, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 128 (2002),
availableat http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/themes/hrdwilson.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2002).
74. Richard Wilson, ChallengingRestorativeJustice, 2 HUM. RTS. DIALOGUE 15 (2002).
75. Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, ch. 5, para. 82
(1998), available at http://www.polity.org.7a/govdocs/commissions/1998/trc/lchap5.htm (last
visited Sept. 23, 2002).
76. See Wilson, supra note 74.
77. Charles Villa-Vicencio, Why PerpetratorsShould not Always be Prosecuted: Where the
InternationalCriminalCourt and Truth CommissionsMeet, 49 EMORY L.J. 205, 217 (2000).
78. Id.
79. See Werchick, supra note 41, at 17.
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guilt or innocence of a person and impose sentences. Yet, there is concern
that the gacaca tribunals do not provide the due process guarantees
required under Rwandan and international law.'
The question will be whether the ICC views this type of extrajudicial
proceeding as inconsistent with the principles of due process recognized
by international law. Regarding all of these extrajudicial proceedings, the
ICC will have to create standards to judge the fairness of proceedings that
are not blatantly unfair." The ICC will have to determine whether a
particular proceeding was conducted in good faith rather than in an attempt
to refuse to prosecute.
One of the most important contributions of the ICC to domestic law
will not be the number of cases it handles, but its unique role of
monitoring and supporting states' judicial processes. 2 To permit domestic
courts to undertake trials without a process to examine the effectiveness
of those domestic courts would significantly diminish the importance of
the ICC. 3
Once a potential case is referred to the ICC, the Prosecutor must notify
all State Parties. The states then have only one month from this
notification to tell the ICC that they are investigating the same matter and
to request the Prosecutor defer the matter to their jurisdiction." Once given
notification of the intention of the State to investigate, the Prosecutor is
obliged to cease investigating the case.
Under the principle of ne bis in idem,"5 an individual is prohibited from
being tried on similar offences by both the domestic court and the ICC,
unless the proceedings in the national domestic courts:

80. For instance, the "gacaca" system does not provide for the participation of counsel at any
stage of the proceedings; nor does it provide defendants the same legal powers as the prosecution.
Id; see generally Danna Harman, Rwanda Turns to its Pastfor Justice, CHRISTIAN So. MONITOR,
Jan. 30, 2002, at 9.
81. Juan E. Mendez, National Reconciliation, Transnational Justice, and the International
Court, 15 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. (2001).
82. See Charney, supra note 19, at 123.
83. Jeffrey L. Bleich, Report of the International Law Association: Published Jointly with
Association Internationale de Droit Penal, 13 Nouvelles Etudes Penales 1997: Complementarity,
25 DENY. J.INT'L L. & POL'Y 281,289 (1997).
84. See ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 18(2). Sunil Kumar Gupta, Sanctum for the War
Criminal: Extradition Law and the International Criminal Court, 3 CAL. CRIM. L. REv. 1, para. 8

(2000).
85. The term means "not twice the same thing."
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(a)
(b)

Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from
criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of
the [ICC]; or
Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially
in accordance with the norms of due process recognized by
international law and were conducted in a manner which, in
the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring
the person concerned to justice. s6

This language is "an international protection against double jeopardy.""7
Yet, the principle of ne bis in idem under the ICC Statute does not prevent
the pre-trial chamber from authorizing the Prosecutor to take necessary
measures for preserving both material and other evidence that could
otherwise be damaged or lost.8" The domestic court could also find its own
proceedings under constant scrutiny by the ICC since the Prosecutor
retains the authority to receive progress reports of the judicial proceeding
as well as review national investigations at any time where a significant
change of circumstances would indicate an unwillingness or inability to
proceed by a state. 9 State Parties are required to respond to such requests
without "undue delay."
The surrendering of the accused to the ICC will also be the
responsibility of the State Parties through their domestic laws. The Statute
distinguishes between extradition and surrender of the accused.9
Extradition refers to the process of handing over the accused to a
requesting state, whereas, surrender refers to the process of handing over
the accused to the ICC. In essence, there is a fundamental difference

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 20.
Gupta, supra note 84, para. 8.
See ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 18(6) & 19(8).
Id. arts. 18(5), 18(3).
Id. art. 18(5).
Article 89 of the ICC Statute reads:
The Court may transmit arequest for the arrest and surrender of a person, together
with the material supporting the request outlined in article 91, to any State on the
territory which that person may be found and shall request the cooperation of that
State in the arrest and surrender of such aperson. State Parties shall, in accordance
with the provisions of this Part and the procedure under their national law, comply
with requests for arrest and surrender.

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 89(l).
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between
The ICC
does not require the extradition of the person.
The procedures of the ICC will likely change the legal requirements of
surrender, at least between the ICC and State Parties. This will involve
states reviewing the compatibility of a constitutional prohibition against
extraditing their own nationals with the requirement of the ICC on State
Parties to arrest and surrender suspects to the ICC. The Statute requests
states to take into account "the distinct nature of the Court" when
establishing the requirements for the surrender process in their
jurisdictions.93 Therefore, requirements should not be more burdensome
than those applicable for extradition between states. The result should be
a more streamlined process for surrendering persons to the ICC than the
current extradition process between states.94
The main reason for an easier process is that surrender proceedings
from a state to the ICC do not have to take into account the unique
sovereign right of states to extradite their own nationals. Since the ICC is
not a foreign jurisdiction or foreign court, as is the court of another state,
these state sovereign rights do not merit the same protection. This is
because the treaty standards were established by the State Parties and thus
are not concerned with protecting State party nationals from the process.95
States will either amend their constitutions to permit surrender of nationals
expressly, or interpret existing constitutions as supportive of ICC
jurisdiction. There are, however, no exceptions for State Parties to adhere
to the arrest and surrender obligations of the Statute. Thus, even where a
constitution of a state prohibits the extradition or surrender of its citizens,
the state will have to find a way to cooperate with the ICC. Therefore,
comprehensive national laws allowing for the arrest and surrender of
suspects to the ICC will greatly assist states in meeting their obligations
to cooperate fully with the ICC.

92. Article 102 of the ICC Statute defines "surrender" as "the delivering up of a person by
a state to the court" and extradition as "the delivering up of a person by a State to the Court." Id.
art. 102.
93. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 91(2)(c).
94. See IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL, supra note 17, at 45. The current state-to-state

extradition process is hindered by lengthy delays and complexities. Among states, there is no one
procedural system for extradition. Extradition is within the boundaries of the domestic law of the
requested state, and thus there is diversity in its application. See David Freestone, International
Cooperation Against Terrorism and the Development of International Law Principles of
Jurisdication,in TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 45 (Rosalyn Higgins & Maurice Flory eds.,

1997).
95. See IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL, supra note 17, at 46.
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The only exception for states cooperating with the ICC by surrendering
an accused will be for non-party states. Although the Statute indicates that
it can request the surrender of an accused from any state, compliance is
only for states that are party to the Statute." The ICC cannot compel a
non-party to surrender an accused to the ICC.
Nevertheless, the procedures of the ICC will also strengthen the
commitment of states to ensure that heads of state and other officials do
not receive immunity for violating international humanitarian law. To date,
there is no treaty or customary international law that removes temporal
immunity of heads of state while in office. 97 International law provides
heads of state and diplomatic officials with immunity from criminal
prosecution by foreign states.9" However, a head of state or other official
who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC is prevented from
raising immunity as a substantive defense to the alleged crime. Article 27
of the ICC Statute provides:
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official
capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a
government official shall in no case exempt a person from
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of
itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the
official capacity of a person, whether under national or
international law, shall not bar the [ICC] from exercising its
jurisdiction over such a person. 99

96. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 89.
97. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdictionfor International Crimes: Historical
Perspectivesand ContemporaryPractice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 84 (2001).
98. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 31(l), 23 U.S.T. 3227,
500 U.N.T.S. 95.
99. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 27.
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This concept is not new. The Treaty of Versailles,"° Nuremberg Charter,'
the Genocide Convention,0 2 the International Law Commis-sion, 0 3 and
the ICTY/ICTR Statutes' ° all recognize the absence of immunity for heads
of state accused of international crimes. However, notwithstanding Article
27 of the Statute, Article 98 of the Statute does provide safeguards for
maintaining the primacy of multilateral treaties over the concept of
immunity. Article 98 reads:
1. The [ICC] may not proceed with a request for surrender or
assistance which would require the requested State to act
inconsistently with its obligations under international law with
respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or
property of a third State, unless the [ICC] can first obtain the
cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.
2. The [ICC] may not proceed with a request for surrender which
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its
obligations under international agreements pursuant to which
the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person
of that State to the [ICC], unless the [ICC] can first obtain the
cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the
surrender.'o
It will be up to the ICC to make certain that it does not request a state
to act inconsistently with its international obligations, i.e, surrendering a
third party national who has immunity to the ICC.' °6 For instance, Article
98 of the Statute would apply to the Status of Forces Agreements and to
07
diplomats covered by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations1
and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. 0 8 Therefore, a head of

100. See generally The Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 188, available
at http://www.history.sandiego.edu/gen/text/versaillestreaty (last visited Sept. 20, 2002).
101. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annex to the Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82
U.N.T.S. 279, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 257-58 (Supp. 1945) [hereinafter Nuremberg
Charter] (outlining the process for prosecuting war criminals in their individual capacity).
102. See Prevention Convention, supra note 24.
103. See Report of ILC - 5th Sess., supra note 7.
104. See ICTYStatute, supranote 27, art. 7(2); see also ICTR Statute, supranote 27, art. 6(2).
105. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art 28.
106. Id. art. 98(l).
107. See generally Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 98.
108. See generallyViennaConvention on Consular Relations, 1963, U.N.T.S. 2638-8640,596,
262-512.
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state or other official covered by immunity under a treaty or pursuant to
customary law could still invoke immunity. State Parties, however, by
agreeing to the Statute would presumably waive any immunities attached
to the ICC. It is likely, therefore, that State Parties would "not place any
restrictions on the ability of other States [sic] to surrender its nationals to
the ICC" since there would be no grounds to refuse surrender.' 9 In
addition, domestic constitutions could be amended to allow surrender of
a national to an international tribunal.
In short, when the ICC requests that a State Party surrender its head of
state, or other official, accused of a crime under the ICC Statute, the state
would surrender the person in accordance with Article 59 of the Statute.
This may, in fact, force states to ensure that their own courts can prosecute
the head of state for the crime committed within the jurisdiction of the
ICC. Under the concept of complementarity, states would likely want to
exercise jurisdiction in such instances.
Whereas granting impunity to heads of states is specifically mentioned
in the Statute, the issue of granting amnesties is not. The absence of any
discussion on this issue reflects the debate as to how effective such
measures are "in bringing about lasting peace and reconciliation."" 0 Under
the Statute, granting blanket amnesties would not be acceptable. However,
granting pardons by a state, after a conviction is obtained in a state court
proceeding, is still an open question."' This issue could be one of the most
significant weaknesses to the complementarity concept. "A domestic court
could in essence investigate, prosecute, convict and sentence a person,"
and then turn around and pardon or parole the person."' If a person was
granted a pardon, the ICC would not try the person again, unless the
national proceedings were viewed as a sham. However, the very fact that
the ICC represents the unprecedented will of nations to hold individuals
accountable for atrocities committed, means that it is unlikely that
impunity for these same crimes would be legitmate.
IV. DEFINING THE TERMS "UNWILLING" AND "UNABLE"
Article 17 of the ICC Statute establishes the criteria to be used in
deciding admissibility. The Statute gives jurisdiction to national courts

109.
110.
III.
tribunals'

See IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL, supra note 17, at 54.

Id. at 86-87.
Under the ICTY and ICTR, such domestic acts of clemency would have no effect on the
ability to try such cases.

112. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 44, at 76.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

21

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 2

[Vol. 15

except in cases where the national institution is unwilling or unable to
investigate or hold proceedings. In those situations, the ICC would have
jurisdiction over the case in question. Both terms were generally accepted
during the drafting process. Yet, how the terms "unwilling" and "unable"
would be determined was hotly debated and has yet to be clearly
established. These terms require greater elaboration to give states comfort
that the ICC will not refuse to cede jurisdiction to a state that desires to
pursue prosecution." 3
While the ICC Statute sets out the scenarios in which jurisdiction over
a particular case would be handed over to the ICC, the criteria for
pinpointing instances of unwillingness or inability are quite vague. The
delegates drafting the Statute believed that the ICC had too broad a
discretion in defining these terms and that there was no objective criteria
on which the ICC could base its determination." 4 Determining that a state
is unwilling or unable to prosecute proves especially challenging, as the
Statute only requires that the ICC have "regard to the principles of due
process recognized by international law."' 'H
Article 17 states the conditions under which national institutions would
be judged as unwilling. Determining unwillingness is a more contentious
issue because of the subjectivity in defining the term." 6 In short, a case
will fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC because of the unwillingness of
a state to prosecute or investigate when it is found that: (1) The
proceedings undertaken or the decision made at the national level was for
the purpose of shielding the accused from the ICC; or (2) There has been
an unjustified delay in proceedings; or (3) The proceedings are not
independent or impartial." 7 There is also an argument that certain
procedural rules that affect the proceedings also be considered a sign of
unwillingness to prosecute. For example, discriminatory requirements
relating to prosecuting sexual violence crimes, such as having male eye
witnesses to a rape of a woman, would be inconsistent with the intent of
the Statute to bring the accused to justice."'

113. See Bleich, supra note 83, at 289.
114. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 44, at 53.
115. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(2).
116. However, the ICC Statute expands the definition of "unwillingness" to include the term
"unable genuinely" which gives a more objective review of a state's intentions. See id. art. 18(3).
117. See id. art. 17(3); see also Bleich, supra note 83, at 290 (defining "ineffective" as when

a state's "forum provides a standard of guilt, or punishment, which is incompatible with
international norms;" or the state "has not demonstrated an actual intention to prosecute, or to
conduct, a full and prompt investigation.").
118. Making the ICC, supra note 55, at 15; see also ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(2).
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The ICC Statute stipulates as to when a nation-state is unable to
undertake the domestic proceeding. The most important factor in
identifying inability is where a total or substantial collapse of national
institutions exists, so as to prevent domestic trials. But there is also one
other factor that creates the test to determine inability. The state must be
unable to secure the accused or to obtain the necessary evidence and
testimony." 9 Both criteria must be shown in order to find that the state is
unable to undertake an investigation. The state must be unable to obtain an
accused or necessary evidence and testimony because of the partial or total
collapse of its judiciary. Meeting this criteria is most apparent in states
emerging from conflict, in which infrastructure and resources have been
destroyed or are unavailable. 2 °
V. DETERMINING THE UNWILLINGNESS OR INABILITY OF'
STATES TO UNDERTAKE DOMESTIC PROSECUTIONS

How can ajudicial system be judged in order to determine the national
willingness or ability to undertake a successful trial? How will these
decisions be rendered in a consistent and objective manner?
As the ICC Statute is written, the designation of unwillingness or
inability of a state to prosecute is made by several different parties at
several different stages of the investigative process. The Prosecutor has the
first opportunity to judge the criteria. It is, however, up to the Pre-Trial
Chamber and the Appeal Chamber to make the final judgment. This
judgment can also be made at several stages during the process, based on
a review of progress reports submitted by states on the status of the
domestic proceedings.' 2 ' However, because of the general ambiguity of the
Statute in defining and determining what constitutes an unwillingness or
inability of a state to prosecute, it will be necessary to develop a more
objective way of passing judgment on the domestic legal and judicial
system of a state.
To begin, the judicial system of a state must, at a minimum, be judged
as independent if it is to be viewed as able to undertake prosecutions. The
minimum standards for judicial independence would include a judicial
system that is impartial, with its decisions respected and enforced, without

119. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(3).
120. See United Nations, ICC Factsheet (Nov. 15, 2001), available at www.un.org/News/
facts/iccfact.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2002).
121. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 18(3), 18(5).
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government interference.' 22 These standards are consistent with the Basic
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary adopted by the United
Nations in 1985.23 It is likely that the ICC would rely on these standards
to guide its decisions on jurisdiction and admissibility. Furthermore, by
relying on these standards, it is possible to determine which countries
would expect to have cases relegated to the jurisdiction of the ICC because
of their inability to prosecute. Devising an objective system for
determining the capacity of the judicial system of a state will be helpful for
the ICC to justify its decisions at all stages.
To determine that a state is unable to prosecute an individual, the ICC
looks at factors that would indicate a collapse of the judiciary of a state. A
state is determined unable when there is "a total or substantial collapse or
unavailability of its national judicial system."' 24 According to the Statute,
this applies to the ability of the state to obtain the accused, to obtain the
necessary evidence and testimony, and to carry out its proceedings.
The words "collapse" and "unavailability" are quite descriptive, and
therefore, one can establish that states determined by the ICC to be unable
to carry out proceedings will likely fall into one of four categories:
1.
2.
3.
4.

States entangled in conflict - either domestic or international,
States experiencing political unrest or economic crisis,
States in transition, and
States entirely lacking the type of judicial system that is
representative of the international standard (certain monarchies,
dictatorships, etc.).

According to the Center for Defense Information, there are currently
thirty-nine significant ongoing conflicts in the world.'25 The National
Defense Council Foundation records fifty-nine countries experiencing

122. Matthew Stephenson, Judicial Independence: What it is, How it can be Measured, Why
it Occurs, available at http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/judicialindependence.htm
(last visited Sept. 23, 2002).
123. The first seven principles focus exclusively on the independence of the judiciary.
Principle 2 provides that the "judiciary shall decide matters before [it] impartially, on the basis of

facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements,
pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason. See U.N.
Principles, supra note 69, para. 2.
124. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(3).
125. See Center for Defense Information, available at http://www.cdi.org/dm/2002/dml02.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2002).
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some form of conflict.'2 6 A state that has experienced war in its own
territory has suffered great losses that may severely limit the effectiveness
of the judiciary. This phenomenon can be identified as a catalyst for the
establishment of the existing tribunal in Rwanda.'
A second indicator of the functioning of ajudicial system is the internal
political situation. Severe political unrest in the form of military coups,
dramatic elections, or upheaval and dissatisfaction in the population have
resulted in violations of rights and disrespect for the rule of law in many
instances. These situations have threatened the independence of the
judiciary and its proper functioning in many countries. In such situations
the standards of judicial independence are often ignored.'28
States falling into the third category, states in transition, are also likely
to be without a functioning judiciary for some amount of time and
therefore unable to carry out proceedings as required in the Statute.
Transitioning from one form of government to another is a long and
difficult process that requires changes in all facets of government.
Transition typically occurs following conflict or political unrest.
Substantial changes would occur at all levels of the government. New
codes and legislation would be adopted and much effort would go into
training judges and those involved with the judiciary in the new
procedures. During this interim period, it would be difficult for a state to
insist it was capable of handling proceedings at the national level.
The fourth category would cover those states that simply ignore the
basic principles that are fundamental to the rule of law. A state whose
dictator has abolished the judiciary would easily fit into this category. In
each of these four scenarios, the ICC could potentially claim jurisdiction
where crimes falling under the Statute have been committed.
126. See National Defense Council Foundation, availableat http://www.ndcf.org/Conflict_
List/World200l/NDCFWorldConflictCount200l.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2002).
127. The widespread violence in 1994 led to the "total collapse" of Rwanda's domesticjustice
system. See The Embassy of the Republic of Rwanda web site, availableat http://www.rwandemb.
org/justice/justice.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2002). During this time, many members of the
judiciary fled the country, were killed or were later charged with participating in the genocide and
imprisoned. The judicial staff left in the country, including judges, prosecutors and investigators,

decreased so dramatically that it was not possible for the courts to function. In addition, courts and
other judicial infrastructure were either severely damaged or looted. Id.
128. In Argentina, political instability resulted in severe violations of rights that amounted to
crimes against humanity. Under Argentina's military junta (1976-1983) thousands of people were
arrested and then disappeared. Most of them were left-wing dissidents and innocent civilians
unconnected with terrorism or any other crime. Argentina is only one example. Similar atrocities
took place in other parts of the world and throughout South America during this period. See
generally Argentina Human Rights web site, availableat http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/
eng.html (last visited Sept. 1i, 2002).
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VI. UTILIZING A THIRD PARTY TO DETERMINE A STATE'S "INABILITY"
TO INVESTIGATE

A number of states have expressed concern about the power of the ICC
to determine unilaterally whether a state has the capacity to undertake
national prosecutions.' There is some dissatisfaction with how the ICC
will objectively deal with this type of decision-making authority. 30
Consequently, a number of states have indicated their discomfort with the
idea of the ICC passing judgment on the operation of their own courts.'
To counter these allegations and concerns, the international community
should consider establishing a Third Party Advisory Council to provide
recommendations on whether or not a country is able to carry out
proceedings. The purpose of such a Council would be to ensure that an
objective, impartial and non-political evaluation is made regarding the
ability of a state to carry out proceedings by evaluating the state's
judiciary. The decisions of this Council would not be binding, but would
be instructive.
The Third Party Advisory Council would include a representative
group of legal experts and academics. The Council would give legitimacy
to the ambiguous process of the ICC for determining admissibility by
making the method less political and more objective.' 32 To ensure fair
geographical representation, the selection of members could be modeled
from the process by which non-permanent members are appointed to the
Security Council.
This Council would base its recommendations on direct communication
with the state in question and would include field visits to assess
infrastructural damage to judicial facilities, meetings with appropriate
ministers, government officials, prosecutors, judges and lawyers, and local
NGOs involved in the justice issues. The Council would also reach out to
conduct extensive interviews with scholars and legal practitioners familiar
with the legal system of the state. Firsthand and unbiased information
about the internal situation of a state would be essential to determine
whether a state is able to conduct domestic proceedings.

129. See Bleich, supra note 83, at 284.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. In a similar way, there will be a large degree of subjectivity in the selection of ICC
judges. It would be appropriate to have an independent appointments committee, comprised of
international practitioners and academics, which would assess the quality ofjudges nominated by
State Parties.
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A written report, containing the full evaluation of the legal system of
the state, would be provided to the ICC and made public. The report would
include the recommendation of the Council on whether the state is able to
conduct the trial. If the Council is unanimous in its rating, the report would
so state. Otherwise, the Council would also enclose any dissenting Council
opinions.
It is very important that such a Council not become another organ of
the ICC. To ensure that it is effective, the Council should be independent
from the ICC in order to retain objectivity. The independence and integrity
of the Council will be key in providing unbiased recommendations to the
ICC.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

"IT]he most serious crimes ofconcern to the international community
as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution
must be ensured by taking measures
at the national level and by enhancing
33
international cooperation.",

The ICC was established to enhance international cooperation by
putting an end to impunity for the perpetrators of grave crimes that
threaten the peace, security and welfare of the world. The role of domestic
implementation of the ICC Statute is absolutely essential to the success of
the ICC.
The creation of the ICC dramatically increases the role of national
courts in undertaking trials involving international crime. Because of the
introduction of the concept of complementarity, the ICC will only have
jurisdiction if there is a breakdown in the national system of justice or a
state simply fails to act. Consequently, the ICC's impact for domestic law
and national capacity building will be significant and far-reaching.
The first responsibility for states will be to adopt or amend the
necessary domestic legislation required to cooperate fully with the ICC.
This will involve both substantive and procedural changes that touch on
an endless number of potential legal areas. If states desire to retain control
over prosecuting nationals charged with crimes under the ICC Statute, they
must ensure that their own judicial systems meet international standards.
At a minimum, states will have to adhere to standards of due process found
in international human rights instruments, particularly as they relate to the
rights of defendants. States will also have to tread carefully when adopting

133. See ICC Statute, supra note I, pmbl.
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judicial proceedings, such as truth commissions, so they are not viewed as
avoiding prosecution.
The practice among a number of states of granting blanket amnesties
for perpetrators of gross violations of international humanitarian law will
have to cease. Domestic legislation will also have to reflect a prohibition
against selective amnesties after conviction since such a policy would be
difficult to defend against the general purpose of the ICC of eliminating
impunity for perpetrators of crimes. The unique ability of the ICC to
monitor the judicial process of a state also adds significantly to nation
building and the capacity of states to undertake domestic war crime trials.
It is in the best interests of the ICC that national courts create the
necessary judicial process to conduct fair trials based on internationally
accepted norms. The end results of these types of reforms will be stronger
national criminal justice systems that conform to international legal
standards.
Under the ICC Statute, there is an opportunity and need for the
international community to play an important role in increasing the
legitimacy of the ICC in judging the capacity of nations to undertake
domestic trials. A number of states have expressed concern about the
power of the ICC to determine unilaterally whether a state has the capacity
to undertake national prosecutions. By creating an Advisory Council to
give recommendations to the ICC on whether or not a country is able to
carry out proceedings, the international community will provide an
important service to the ICC. The overall success of the ICC is dependent
on the willingness of nation-states to undertake a serious commitment to
prosecute their own nationals who have violated international
humanitarian law. The ICC requires this commitment; the voices of past
victims of crimes by aggressors demand it.
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